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1 Introduction
Models are generally used by scientists to obtain predictions and to provide
explanations about phenomena. Their predictive and explanatory power is
usually thought of as depending on their representative power: a model is a
device standing for a target system in virtue of some relationship between
its features and features of the system. This representational relationship
enables scientists to draw inferences and to obtain information concerning the
target system by reasoning with - and in some cases literally manipulating
- the model. It is still not clear, though, in virtue of which features models
allow such inferences to be drawn.
Some philosophers1 have argued that appealing to isomorphism2 between
models and target systems is not sufficient to explain how models are used by
cognitive agents, in practice, to represent the systems they study. The fact
that the structure of theories seems to adequately capture the "structure" of
the world is a genuine philosophical problem - roughly, the problem of the use
of mathematics in science3 - but it does not solve the problem of how scientists
use representing devices to draw inferences about the systems they study.
Examining this problem does not commit anyone to any particular conception
of the structure of scientific theories. When it comes to representation, one
has to pay attention to the kind of cognitive operations and sometimes to
the concrete manipulations scientists perform when they learn, develop and
1[Frigg, 2002], [Frigg, 2008], [Suárez, 2003].
2According to the semantic conception of theories, whose main defenders are Patrick
Suppes, Frederick Suppe, Bas Van Fraassen, and Ronald Giere, theories are sets of math-
ematical models which stand in an isomorphic relationship with the phenomena. Ronald
Giere, though, stands slightly apart, by speaking of similarity between models and phe-
nomena, and by insisting on the pragmatic and cognitive aspects of representing.
3[Frigg, 2008], section 6 argues for this distinction between the problem of representa-
tion and the problem of the application of mathematics to reality.
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apply theories. They do not use theories as wholes, but rather representing
devices of various kinds - which are most often called "models": diagrams,
graphs, 3D scale models, imaginary models such as the simple pendulum,
etc.
In this paper, I will focus on a particular kind of models, namely imag-
inary models (from now, I-models), like the simple pendulum. The impor-
tance of such models has been forcefully underlined by recent contributions4,
and they appear to be omnipresent in scientific learning, theorizing and prac-
tice. In addition, they pose a special problem to an analysis of representation,
since they are not particular concrete devices like equations or diagrams. On
the other hand, they are not reducible to the mathematical structures they
might instantiate5. Roman Frigg6 distinguishes between two sets of questions
concerning I-models (which he calls "model systems"), namely ontological
questions about what kind of entities I-models are, and semantic questions
about what kind of relationships I-models have with the phenomena they
stand for. Frigg addresses the first problem as a preliminary to solve the sec-
ond one. I take a different route, and I shall address the semantic problem,
by turning it in the following way: how do scientists use I-models to draw
inferences and gain knowledge about the systems they stand for?
First, I propose a clarification of the very notion of representation (2.1)
by emphasizing the importance of what I call the format of a representation
(2.2) to the inferences cognitive agents can draw from it. Then, I turn to
the core question and I analyze the various representational relationships
that are in play in the use of I-models (3.1 and 3.2). I finally conclude that
there is no special semantics to be applied to I-models, and that the study of
the representational power of models in general should instead focus on the
variety of the formats that are used in scientific practice.
2 Formats of representation
In this section, I shall present a conception of representation which is not to
be restricted to the scientific domain, though focusing only on the knowledge-
seeking aspects of representing, and I will introduce a new notion, namely
the notion of a format, which is intended to help us capture some important
phenomena at play when cognitive agents use representations in order to gain
4[Frigg, 2002], [Frigg, 2008], [Giere, 2006].
5As Frigg states, they "do not exist spatio-temporally but are nevertheless not purely
mathematical or structural in that they would be physical things if they were real."
[Frigg, 2008], section 2.
6[Frigg, 2008].
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knowledge on something. That is a necessary preliminary to a study of the
use of I-models in representing target systems, which I will start in section 3.
2.1 Representation
I propose to define representation - or representing7 - as a cognitive activity
which consists in using some device (the representing device, or represen-
tans) in order to gain knowledge concerning something it stands for (the
representatum). In the most straightforward and less problematic cases, the
representans is a particular concrete object, which can be marks on a paper,
vibrations of the air, or anything else to which one can have a direct percep-
tual access8. The representatum can be a physical object, some properties
of an object, the temporal evolution of a value, a causal process, etc. I will
neutrally speak of the "scene" represented.
The perceptual properties of the representans are signals carrying in-
formation for us concerning the representatum. "Information", here, is to
be understood as referring to any propositional content that can be object
of belief. Thus, "informational content" is synonymous with "propositional
content". Since I am exclusively interested in the knowledge or information-
seeking function of representation, I restrict my analysis to the propositional
content of representing devices9.
In order to gain knowledge about the representatum by means of the rep-
resentans, a cognitive agent has to master the rules of interpretation of these
signals. Indeed, a device can be used in representing a scene in virtue of
various - at a pinch, an infinity of - kinds of relationships between its percep-
tual properties and the properties of the scene. Any device can be decreed
to represent any scene by fiat. The representational relationship can also
be grounded in non conventional relationships between the representatum
and the representans : for instance, a photograph of a dog represents that
dog - under some conditions of luminosity and framing, and provided the
photograph is taken from the adequate distance and with the correct focus
- in virtue of the causal relationship between the light reflected by the dog
7One has to be careful with the term "representation", which can be used to refer to
1. a type of actions (representing), in which case it comes without any pronoun, 2. a
particular representing device, and 3. an equivalence class of representing devices. Most
of the time, the context dispels any ambiguity.
8By speaking of "direct perceptual access", I am not committing myself to any partic-
ular theory of perception; I think there is an uncontroversial way of assessing that I have
a direct perceptual access to the concrete physical objects around me, whereas abstract
objects such as mathematical structures or propositions are not accessed the same way.
9For instance, I am not interested in the expressive content of a representation, in the
Goodmanian sense of "expression" ([Goodman, 1976], ch. 2).
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and the exposure of the film. Of course, even that kind of representational
relationship relies on various conventional parameters, but the causal rela-
tionship plays a fundamental role in the establishment of the representational
relationship between the picture and the dog.
Nelson Goodman10 conceives the relationships between any representans
and its representatum as a kind of denotation, governed by some specific
symbol system. A symbol system consists in a syntax and a semantics: the
syntax is the set of the perceptual properties (the "marks") that count as
signals carrying information, together with their combination rules, and the
semantics establishes the relationship between these properties and what
they denote. According to what symbol system is used in interpreting it, the
same set of marks can denote very different scenes. For instance, a "black
wiggly line on white backgrounds" can be a "momentary electrocardiogram"
representing heartbeats in a diagrammatic system, as well as a "drawing
of Mt. Fujiyama". The relevant perceptual properties of both systems are
different: for instance, the "thickness of the line, its color and intensity,
the absolute size of the diagram, etc., do not matter", whereas any of these
properties - and any change in them - is significant in the case of the sketch11.
In this paper, I adopt such a perspective on representation, though I shall
propose a new notion, namely the notion of a format, in order to capture cog-
nitive and pragmatic features of the use of representation by human agents,
which the notion of a symbol system ignores.
2.2 Formats
By mastering the symbol system under which a representing device has to
be interpreted, one can draw information about its representatum. Now, it
is worth noting that two representing devices can contain the very same in-
formation (concerning the same thing) though conveying it in different way
to us12. Consider for example a digital picture and the linguistic coding for
each of its pixel: they are strictly equivalent as to the information they con-
tain. But only the two-dimensional one enables unaided human subjects to
draw information concerning the scene that has been pictured. The infor-
mational content of the linguistic coding, without any external computing
device which would transform it into a two-dimensional picture, is strictly
inaccessible to us.
10[Goodman, 1976].
11[Goodman, 1976], pp. 229-230.
12In Herbert Simon and Jill Larkin's terms, such representations are "informationally
equivalent" but "computationally different" [Simon and Larkin, 1987].
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There are other examples of informationally equivalent representations
which are different as to their cognitively accessible content in less dramatic
a way. Consider the following one13: the results of a temperature survey
can be presented as a list of triples of numerals, the first two standing for
the coordinates of the different places where measurements were taken and
the third for the corresponding temperature values; the very same data can
also be presented in a two-dimensional map, on which the locations of the
triples of numerals keep the relative distance between the places where mea-
surements were taken. Colors corresponding to ranges of temperatures could
also be added on the corresponding areas. The information contained in
both representations is exactly the same, and human agents - unlike in the
picture/bits case - are able to draw it from any of them. But the map makes
some information much more easily available: for instance, if warm shades
stand for high temperatures and cold shades for low temperatures, one can
quickly conclude that the southern part of the represented area is warmer
than its northern part. In order to extract such information from the corre-
sponding list of numerals, one would need to achieve various inferential steps.
Moreover, the inferential operations leading to the same conclusion from the
consideration of both representations are not of the same kind: reading nu-
merical values and comparing them by taking into account the corresponding
coordinates does not consist in the same cognitive operation as comparing
the relative locations of different colors on the map.
More generally, one can state that in any representation, some pieces of
information are immediately14 available, though others are extractible via an
inferential process that can consist in a more or less large number of steps,
and which can be of various kinds15.
13This example is freely inspired by a manuscript by John Kulvicki [Kulvicki, 2008].
14Whether or not there is a kind of perceptual knowledge which is not the product
of any inferential process - which is genuinely immediate - is not relevant to my point;
by speaking of "immediately available information" as opposed to information which is
obtained through inferences, I am not claiming that there is a difference in nature rather
than in degree between both. Let's imagine there is water on the pavement while I am
walking on the street; I would say that the proposition "there is water" is an immediately
accessible piece of information, whereas "it has rained" is obtained through an inferential
process. I cannot get into more details here, but the intuitive notion of immediacy will do
the job. [Kulvicki, 2008] proposes an elaboration of this notion.
15In the area of Artificial Intelligence, studies in the problem-solving abilities of human
agents (for a philosophical treatment, see for instance [Simon and Larkin, 1987]), have
shown how the presentation of data in a two-dimensional image can dramatically enhance
the inferential capacities of agents. Sometimes, such considerations come along with cog-
nitive hypotheses concerning the format of mental representations and reasonings (see
[Johnson-Laird, 1983]). But such hypotheses are not required to state that the mode of
presentation matters to human reasoning capacities.
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The notion of a format is intended to capture these cognitive or inferen-
tial16 differences such changes in representation make. Certainly, in Good-
manian terms, one can say that these various representations are to be in-
terpreted in various symbol systems: their syntactic and semantic rules are
thoroughly different. But my point is to characterize and measure the differ-
ences between these various representations from the pragmatic and cognitive
perspective of the agent who is supposed to draw inferences from the rep-
resentans in order to gain knowledge about the representatum. Therefore,
the notion of a format is context and agent-relative, whereas the notion of a
symbol system can be fully defined in objective terms of syntax and seman-
tics.
An informal definition of a format would be the following: the format of a
representation is the particular way a representation conveys the information
it contains to the user. The digital picture and its linguistic coding are in two
different formats; the list of numerals and its corresponding map also. More
precisely, the format FRS of a particular device R representing some scene S
can be isolated according to the inferential power of the representation, that
consists in
• I : the kind and quantity of information about S a particular agent A
in a particular context C can draw from R;
• CC : the relative length of the inferential process P - or the number of
inferential steps, if they can be counted - necessary for A in C to draw
I from R (the cognitive cost);
• CK : the kind of cognitive operations involved in P.
Certainly, all that depends on the syntax and semantics of the system
under which R is interpreted, but this is not sufficient. FRS also depends
on A and C : the cognitive abilities, skills and background knowledge of the
agent, her cognitive goals (the information she is seeking), the information
which is previously available, etc. Indeed, according to the agent's cognitive
abilities and goals, any change in the perceptual properties does not neces-
sarily count as a change in format, since it is not necessarily a change in
the inferential power of the representation: for instance, in a graph repre-
senting the temporal evolution of the position of a pendulum, the relevant
properties are the coordinates of the points representing its position. The
16I speak equally of cognitive or inferential equivalence and difference. Although there
are cognitive processes that cannot be characterized as inferential, all the cognitive pro-
cesses with which I am concerned are inferential in kind, since I am exclusively interested
in the propositional content of representations.
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color of the line does not matter: whether the line is blue or red, I, CC, and
CK are strictly the same, thus the format is the same. Now, if one wants to
represent the temporal evolution of two different pendulums with different
frequency of oscillations, it can be useful to draw the two lines in different
colors. A graph with two colors facilitates the inferences, as compared with
a graph representing the two pendulums in the same color. Therefore, the
bicolor graph and the unicolor graph are not in the same format - though
their formats are quite close. Finally, if one draws a graph representing the
temporal evolution of the position of a pendulum with various colors, cor-
responding for instance to the varying temperature of the room, the format
again changes, since more information is available; but if one is only inter-
ested in the position of the pendulum, the colors create a useless noise, which
can render inferences concerning the temporal evolution of the position less
easy than in the case of a unicolor graph17.
Now, certainly, I, CC, and CK are practically impossible to measure in a
precise way. Nevertheless, one can compare two representations a and b by
saying that, for instance, drawing such piece of information from a demands
a greater cognitive cost than from b, or that some piece of information which
is available in a is practically inaccessible in b. Likewise, despite the fact
that we still do not have any precise description of the format of mental
representations and processes, one can intuitively acknowledge that drawing
information from a graph and from an equation does not consist in the same
kind of cognitive process. The notion of a format is mainly intended to be a
comparison tool between different representations of the same scene, which
are (at least partially) informationally equivalent.
Finally, I define a representation-type as the class of all possible and actual
representing devices of the same scene in the same format. In other words, a
representation-type is identified on the basis of its inferential power18: it is
the class of all representing devices that enable agents with equal cognitive
17Insisting on the agent and context-relativity of the notion of a format might seem
useless, since in my analysis of the use of I-models, I will not mention individual agents'
differences, implicitly assuming an average scientist with normal cognitive abilities. Nev-
ertheless, these precisions are worth giving, at least for two different reasons: first, the
notion of a format can be used in other kinds of analysis, where individual differences
matter; and second, since the notion of a format is intended to account for the cognitive
aspects of the interpretation of representations, it is necessarily human-relative, contrary
to the notion of a symbol system. Therefore, a formal definition of it cannot ignore the
agent's importance.
18Such a conception could be provided useful tools from the so-called "conceptual role se-
mantics"(see, for instance, [Greenberg and Harman, 2005]), according to which the mean-
ing or content of a representation consists in its inferential role in the cognitive life of the
agents.
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abilities in equivalent contexts to draw the exact same information through
the same inferential processes.
3 How do we use I-models to represent target
systems?
Let me now turn to my main question: how do we use I-models to represent
physical systems19? I-models are widely used by scientists when they develop
hypotheses as well as when they predict and explain phenomena; they also
play a central role in scientific learning. In textbooks, laws are most often
introduced by reference to an I-model which enables students understand
what the law means. When it comes to predicting and explaining the be-
havior of some physical system, one appeals most of the time to an I-model,
claiming that it "applies", with various approximations and idealizations, to
the target system: for instance, the motion of the bob of a grandfather clock
can be represented by means of the simple pendulum. There are many other
examples of I-models in various scientific fields; one could cite, for instance,
the billiard ball model for the study of molecular motion in the kinetic theory
of gases, isolated populations in population genetics, and perfectly rational
agents in economics.
I propose to characterize I-models as the imaginary referents of some
scientific laws: they do not exist in the external world, but would they ex-
ist, their behavior would be the perfect instantiation of those laws. Some
philosophers, such as Roman Frigg20, claim that I-models ("model systems")
are fictions21. Though I roughly agree in calling them fictions, my main con-
cern is with how we use I-models in representing, and, as will appear later,
such a question can be addressed without adopting any particular position
about the nature of fiction. I will therefore remain agnostic on this topic.
Keeping in mind that the main goal of a model is to enable one to draw
inferences concerning the system it stands for, in virtue of which features
can one say that I-models are used in representing? Is there some special
semantics to be applied to them?
My strategy in answering such questions will consist in analyzing and
clarifying the different representational relationships that are in play in the
use of an I-model - the model of the simple pendulum -, by relying on the
19I use "physical system", "target system" and sometimes "system" to refer to the
concrete piece of the world whose behavior is being studied.
20[Frigg, 2008].
21Whereas Ronald Giere [Giere, 2006] denies that they are fictions, and defines them as
"abstract objects".
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account of representation proposed in section 2. Indeed, there are at least
two representational relationships involved in what was exposed above. First
(3.1), the simple pendulum has to be given by a representation of some sort,
since one cannot have a direct perceptual access to it. In that case, I will
speak of "characterization" rather than of "representation", for reasons I
shall give in the next section. Second (3.2), the physical system under study
is represented by means of the simple pendulum. I will show that the key of
the representational power of I-models lies in the relation between these two
representational processes.
3.1 Characterizations of the I-model
In this paragraph, my aim is to highlight the fact that an I-model - e.g., the
simple pendulum - cannot be accessed unless given in some particular format,
and that it can be characterized in various formats, according to what infor-
mation one wants to obtain. Since it does not exist in the spatio-temporal
world, it has to be accessed by means of our representational capacities such
as language22. Following Nelson Goodman, and for the sake of clarity, I shall
not speak of "representation" of the simple pendulum, keeping "representa-
tion" for the cases in which the representatum does exist. I will rather speak
of "characterizations"23.
The simple pendulum is introduced in most mechanics textbooks as a
referent of the law of oscillatory motion. It is defined as a mass point m
fixed in the inferior extremity of an inextensible thread with no mass and of
length l, that can move freely around its fixed superior extremity. Fig. 1 is
a schematic drawing of the simple pendulum.
In the theoretical framework of Classical Mechanics, one can describe the
motion of the pendulum bob by the following equation, where x stands for
the position, a24 for the acceleration, and g for the gravitational force.
ma = −(mg
l
)xcos(α) (1)
For oscillations of small amplitudes, the angle of swing α is small enough
22Again, since I do not want to argue for any particular conception of fiction, I do not
claim that the pendulum is constructed by our representational capacities; nevertheless,
whatever its ontological status is, it cannot be accessed unless via concrete characteriza-
tions.
23In Goodmanian terms, the characterizations of the pendulum are pendulum-
representations.
24Bold characters stand for vectorial quantities.
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Figure 1: The simple pendulum
to allow one to consider cos(α) as equal to one. Thus, one obtains:
ma = −(mg
l
)x (2)
This is a linear differential equation that describes a linear oscillatory motion.
Without such an approximation, the motion described would not be linear.
The solutions of this equation for both position x (t), and velocity v(t),
as functions of time have an harmonic form represented by the function
f(t) = Acos[(
√
g
l
)t] + Bsin[(
√
g
l
)t] (3)
where A and B are constants to be determined by the initial conditions of
the system represented.
By adding the initial conditions into function (3), one can draw a graph
both for the position and velocity of m as functions of time. Both graphs
will have a sinusoidal form. For initial conditions x(t=0) = A and v(t=0) = 0,
one obtains the graphs given in Figure 225.
In some cases, it becomes advantageous to describe the motion of the
pendulum in terms of energy, instead of force. The equations of motion for
the system can be written with the Hamiltonian H which is the sum of the
kinetic and potential energies of the system:
dx
dt
=
DH
Dp
(4)
25I took this figure from [Giere, 1988], p. 69. In his chapter, these graphs represent
position and velocity of a mass and spring system. But, once the approximation of the
angle of swing of the pendulum α to zero has been done, the equation for both models is
the same.
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Figure 2: Position x and velocity v as functions of time for the mass of the
pendulum. (Taken from [Giere, 1988], p. 69)
and
dp
dt
= −DH
Dx
(5)
The solutions of equations (4) and (5) are in terms of position x(t) and
momentum p(t). Taking x and p as axis of a two-dimensional euclidian state-
space, the state of the system at any instant is represented by a unique point,
and its evolution is represented by an ellipse (Figure 3).
Figure 3: The state of a simple pendulum in a position-momentum space.
(Taken from [Giere, 1988], p. 72)
The equations and graphs I have presented are mechanical characteriza-
tions of the temporal evolution of the simple pendulum in various formats.
Indeed, the notion of a format enables us to distinguish between linguistic
and spatial representations, but also between two linguistic representations
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and between two spatial representations. The differences between formats
are of various degrees and occur along various dimensions26.
The graph in Fig. 2 is drawn from function (3): it represents its values
in some specific conditions; displaying those solutions in such a graphical
format, though it adds nothing to their informational content, nevertheless
makes some information immediately accessible to the agent, who would have
to make various inferences to draw it from the consideration of the solutions
displayed in linguistic format.
The difference in format between Newtonian and Hamiltonian equations
is of another kind: both are linguistic formats, and they are mathematically
equivalent, since it can be shown that they are interdeducible. Nevertheless,
they are inferentially different. They are not used in the same cases and they
do not facilitate the same inferences. Using one format and the other does
not imply the same kind of cognitive operation: solving a problem in the
framework of the Newtonian format involves dealing with second-order dif-
ferential equations whose solutions are in terms of position and velocity - and
which are in some cases intractable - , while Hamiltonian equations are first-
order equations and their solutions are in terms of position and momentum.
Moreover, Hamiltonian equations reveal the deep relations between Classical
Mechanics and other fields of physics - such as statistical mechanics, quan-
tum mechanics and relativistic quantum mechanics - whose core equations
are in close formats.
Consideration of the graphs respectively drawn from the Newtonian and
the Hamiltonian linguistic formats makes clearly appear the differences be-
tween them. It makes also appear their equivalence: one can indeed un-
derstand the connection between the state space of Fig. 3 and the solutions
displayed in Fig. 2 by imagining a third axis, representing time, perpendicular
to the x-p plane. The state of the system as a function of time is represented
by an elliptically shaped spiral moving out along the t axis (Fig. 4).
By projecting this path on the x-t and p-t planes, one obtains the sinu-
soidal functions whose graphs were given in Fig. 2. Similarly, the projection
of the state in the x-t-p space onto the x-p plane yields the ellipse pictured in
Fig. 3.27 That shows the various dimensions along which changes in format
26Distance between formats could be thought of as a function of the cognitive cost
that is needed to draw a representation in one format from a representation in another
format; and the dimension along which a change in format occurs can be thought of as
depending on the kind of cognitive operation that is needed: for instance, drawing a graph
from an equation is not the same kind of operation as mapping a graph in some reference
frame onto another reference frame. Both are changes in formats, occurring along different
dimensions.
27All this exposition is drawn from [Giere, 1988].
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Figure 4: The state of the simple pendulum in a position-momentum-time
space. (Taken from [Giere, 1988], p. 73)
can occur, and the different inferences such changes facilitate.
It is worth noting here the strong analogy between my formats and Paul
Humphreys' templates ([Humphreys, 2004]). A template is a syntactic com-
putational scheme that is relatively theory-independent, in the sense that
there can be different templates within the same theoretical field, and that the
same template can be found in different fields. Newtonian and Hamiltonian
equations are typically two different templates within the field of mechanics,
where sometimes a change in template results in a change in tractability; in
turn the Hamiltonian template is also used in other fields. Rather than being
attached to some determinate theory or domain of phenomena, they embody
forms of computation. Humphreys' goal in proposing such a notion is to
draw our attention to practice and computability, in contrast with purely
logical approaches, which consider as equivalent formulations that are never-
theless not equally tractable. Such a perspective contributed to motivate my
elaboration of the notion of a format. Nevertheless, there is a deep difference
between templates and formats, which is grounded in a difference in perspec-
tive: templates make a computational difference for non human (and thus
non cognitive) computing devices, whereas formats are intended to account
for cognitive differences in the use of representations by human agents, and
many changes in format would make no difference from the perspective of
computer science.
I have shown that the simple pendulum can be characterized in different
formats, which are not inferentially equivalent. Here, the pendulum is not
the representing device, but rather the thing being represented - or, better
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said, characterized. Now, it is time to turn to the second branch of the
question: how can the pendulum itself be the representing device?
3.2 Representations of the target system
Consider a physical system such as a grandfather clock, whose bob has a
mass m and whose cable has a length l. The various characterizations of the
simple pendulum do not fit precisely the motion of its bob, since its cable has
a mass, its bob has a volume, and there are other forces exerting on it, such
as the resistance of the air and various frictional forces. Thus, in order to
represent this system by means of the model of the simple pendulum, one has,
first, to write down the particular values of m and l, and to specify the initial
conditions of the system: the position and velocity of the bob at time t0.
Then, one has to determine the additional forces exerting on the system, due
to the volume of the bob (which is not a mass point), the frictions, and the
resistance of the air. Provided one makes all the appropriate approximations,
distortions and idealizations, one can finally write down an equation that
enables one to predict the position and velocity of the bob at time ti. Such
an equation is a specification of the equation of the simple pendulum that
fits more or less precisely (according to the goal one aims at) the particular
conditions at hand. It amounts to what Nancy Cartwright calls a "prepared
description"28 of the system. Note that, in order to write the equation, it
can be very useful to make a schematic drawing of the system, in order to
specify the forces that apply to it. Such a schematic drawing itself consists
in a specification of the schematic drawing of the simple pendulum that fits
- with distortions and approximations - the system under study. Likewise,
in order to quickly determine the period of oscillation of the bob, it can be
useful to draw a graphical representation of its temporal evolution from the
equation thus obtained.
In all these cases, what are the devices that are used to represent the
clock? An equation, a drawing, a graph. Again, in order to draw inferences
and to gain knowledge concerning the behavior of the system being modeled,
one has to couch a representation in some particular format, and each format
has a particular cognitive utility, according to the intended goal. But in
no way does the pendulum per se serve as the representing device. The
representing device cannot be the I-model in abstracto, but rater a concrete
representation in some particular format, that can be reasoned with29.
28[Cartwright, 1983].
29One could object that my definition of a representans as a particular concrete object is
question-begging: since the pendulum is not a concrete object, it cannot be a representing
device. Nevertheless, some people are so familiar to the behavior of pendulums that they
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In what sense, then, can we say that we use the model of the simple pen-
dulum to represent the behavior of the clock? I claim that such a statement
means that we use representations in the same formats as those that are
used in characterizing it. The equation, drawing, and graph representing the
behavior of the clock are in the same format as, respectively, the equation,
drawing, and graph of the simple pendulum. Since each format has its own
cognitive utility, the simple pendulum can be used in drawing various kinds
of inferences; therefore, one cannot identify the model of the simple pendu-
lum with a unique representation-type - and it can be accessed via various
characterization-types.
What, then, warrants the unicity of the I-model? Why wouldn't we say
that there are as many models as representation-types? Again, the Good-
manian toolbox is useful here. Let me briefly recall some points made in
[Goodman, 1976]. Since representation is a kind of denotation, there cannot
be representations of non existing objects, such as unicorns. Therefore, what
we usually call a "picture of a unicorn" is a unicorn-picture, that is, a kind of
thing that is itself denoted by the label "unicorn-picture", but that denotes
nothing. Unicorn-names, unicorn-descriptions, and unicorn-pictures have
in common their belonging to the broader class of unicorn-representations.
Now, to represent an existing object, e.g. Churchill, one has to use some
picture, word, or any other representing device. This representing device in
turns belongs to some class of representing devices that are given some label,
e.g. "unicorn-picture", "bulldog-picture", "man-name", etc., but, which do
not necessarily denote an actual man, bulldog, or, a fortiori, unicorn. For
instance, a caricature of Churchill that denotes him with the features of a
bulldog is a representation of Churchill, since it denotes the man Churchill,
and it is a bulldog-representation, though it does not denote any actual
bulldog. It is a representation of Churchill as a bulldog. Turning back to
the simple pendulum, equation (2) is typically what Goodman would call a
pendulum-equation, and more precisely a pendulum-newtonian-equation: it
has no actual referent, but it is given under the label "equation of a simple
pendulum". Likewise, all the characterizations I have given in section 3.2
belong to the same class, namely, the class of things that are denoted by
the label "pendulum-representations"30. I thus claim that using the simple
do not even need to use pencil and paper to write down the equation and that they
can compute its solutions without drawing an external concrete representation of it. But
my claim is that, even if merely imagined, the pendulum does not represent per se: the
representation which is imagined and reasoned with is, again, in a particular format, either
an equation or a graph, in either the Newtonian or the Hamiltonian formulation.
30It is worth insisting on the fact that this does not intend to be a claim concerning
the ontology of mathematical objects. Appealing to Goodman's tools in order to analyze
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pendulum to represent a target system consists in representing this system
as a simple pendulum, that is, in proposing a pendulum-representation of
the system31.
To sum up, an I-model such as the simple pendulum cannot be identified
with one unique representation-type, but rather with a class of representation-
types (here, the class of all pendulum-representations) that might be logically
but not inferentially equivalent. There is not one and only kind of inferential
process that can be achieved by using an I-model, but rather as many as
there are different formats used in characterizing it32.
how representation works, in practice, does not necessarily commit me to any nominalist
position in the philosophy of mathematics. I am not claiming that there is no mathematical
structure which is common to all the characterizations of the pendulum, but rather that,
in an analysis of the inferential processes involved in using representations, formats play
the crucial role.
31This account is consistent with how science is taught: students first learn the law of
oscillatory motion by being given the example of the simple pendulum, which instantiates
it. They learn what the pendulum is by being told that it is a mass-point hanging on
a mass-free thread, by reading the equation, the graph, etc., exactly in the same way as
a child learns what a unicorn is by being shown a unicorn-picture or being told that a
unicorn is a horse with a horn. So doing, students learn the formats that are used in
mechanics to represent a system as obeying the law and they get familiar to manipulating
them and applying them to actual physical systems, that is, to represent physical systems
as pendulums.
32Here, it might be useful, as a mean to clarify my proper claim, to compare it to Ronald
Giere's views on representation as he exposes them in [Giere, 2006]. Indeed, he insists on
the importance of the concrete manipulation of external devices by scientists in order to
do a reasoning concerning the phenomena they study. In his chapter 5, he raises the exact
same problem as the one I have been addressing here: how can abstract objects play a
role in representation, since representation consists in reasoning with external devices? He
thus suggests that "the expert is using the external representations in order to reconstruct
[italics original] aspects of the abstract model relevant to the problem at hand." (p. 105)
He also underlines the variety of the representational means to access and characterize
abstract models: "Watson and Crick's physical model of DNA, for example, also serve the
purpose of specifying some features of an abstract model of DNA, such as the pitch of
the helix and the allowable base pairs." (p. 106). So, Giere acknowledges that, even in
the case of abstract models, scientists need to draw (either concretely or mentally) some
representation in some format. But I would not say that, doing so they "reconstruct"
aspects of the abstract model, in order to compare its properties with properties of the
system at hand. Indeed, if the practice of representing relies on similarities, as Giere
argues, the similarity holds between the concrete external DNA physical model and the
molecule, rather than between the abstract model and the molecule.
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4 Conclusion
The analysis of the representational function of models was initially moti-
vated by the project of shedding light on scientists' ability to give predic-
tions and explanations. I have shown that this ability depends rather on the
formats of the particular representing devices than on I-models themselves.
Indeed, there is no genuine representational relationship between I-models
and target systems. Rather, the representational power of I-models lies in
the formats that are used in characterizing them and in the inferences they
enable us to do.
Therefore, I am led to conclude that there is no special semantics to be
applied to I-models33: they do not represent their target in virtue of some
properties that are specific to them as imaginary entities and that make
them similar in some sense to it. Rather, even in the case of representation
by means of an I-model, the actual reasoning or manipulation is led on a
particular device, whose format matters to the predictions and explanations
one can draw from it.
Such conclusions indicate that we are on the way to get a unified account
of scientific representation by models in general, since representation by I-
models is not more mysterious than representation by means of diagrams,
graphs, equations, etc. This suggests that a study of scientific representation
should take as object of analysis the variety of formats that are used in
scientific practice, in order to determinate their different virtues, the way
they relate to each other and to the principles of the theory, and the kind of
reasoning they enable scientists to do.
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